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FINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART II: OUR
FRAGMENTING LEGAL COMMUNITY
HARLAN GRANT COHEN*
Is there an “International Community”? This Article suggests that
there is not, that the oft-discussed fragmentation of international law reveals
that there are in fact multiple overlapping and competing international law
communities, each with differing views on law and legitimacy.
This Article reaches this conclusion by taking a fresh look not only at
the sources of fragmentation, but at the sources of international law itself.
Building on earlier work rethinking international law’s sources and drawing insights from legal philosophy, compliance theory, and international
relations, this Article takes a closer look at three areas that have challenged
traditional interpretations of international law: (1) human rights, (2)
global administrative law, and (3) the law applied by international tribunals. What it finds is that the challenges posed by each area run much
deeper than doctrine; in fact, in each area a new legal community has
formed that no longer shares traditional international law’s understanding
of legitimate lawmaking. These legal communities no longer recognize a
single, unifying doctrine of sources.
Such a realization puts conflicts over international law in a new light.
To the extent that debates between human rights and international humanitarian law or trade law and the environment represent debates over the standards for legitimate lawmaking rather than conflicts over interpretation,
doctrinal fixes will never fully resolve them. Instead, they must be viewed as
true conflicts of law; resolutions must mediate between the overlapping demands of different legal communities.
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* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you
to Dan Bodansky, Shirlee Tevet Cohen, Molly Beutz Land, Edith Brown
Weiss, Peter Spiro, Jeff Dunoff, Cora True-Frost, Steven Ratner, Monica
Hakimi, David Zaring, Jutta Brunée, Benedict Kingsbury, and participants in
workshops at NYU, Michigan, Emory, Arizona State, and Temple Law
Schools, and in the New Voices panel at the 104th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law. Thank you also to Tina Termei,
Kristin Tessman, and Ryan Tuck for their excellent research assistance and
for their willingness to hear me drone on about this project.
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1. See, e.g., Symposium, The Normalizing of Adjudication in Complex International Governance Regimes: Patterns, Possibilities, and Problems, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL.755–1012 (2009); Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony: New Sources of
Norms in International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004); Symposium, The
Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
679 (1999).
2. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by
Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter, U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation Report].

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 5 Side B

The potential fragmentation of international law has garnered a great deal of attention over the past ten years. International law’s rapid expansion into almost every area of
human affairs paired with the seemingly sudden proliferation
of international tribunals, courts, and interpretative bodies has
led to increased disagreement over international rules and increasingly divergent decisions on international law obligations.
The absence of obvious or agreed-upon mechanisms for
resolving these disputes has threatened to tear international
law apart at the seams. Finding a way to keep the fabric of
international law whole or to mend the tears once they have
formed has become a practical and scholarly obsession,1 resulting most notably in a report from the International Law
Commission.2
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Most of these responses have cast the fragmentation of international law in doctrinal or technical terms.3 Human rights
bodies, trade and investment tribunals, regional courts, and a
myriad of other international actors disagree on the meaning
of particular treaties or international law rules, the relationship between them, and who should have the authority to interpret them. Some of these disagreements, like those over
the detention and targeting of alleged terrorists or the availability of generic drugs in poor countries, have become quite
bitter. But the assumption has always been that these actors
agree on more than they disagree, that they are part of a single
international law community, that they are following the same
set of rules (even as they disagree on their exact interpretation). Whatever disagreements they may have over interpretation, it is assumed that they agree on the basic doctrine of
sources. These assumptions are shared by both those concerned about fragmentation, who suggest doctrinal tweaks designed to reconcile opposing views,4 and those who embrace
fragmentation, who suggest that the best rules for all will
emerge from competition between fora.5 Moreover, despite
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3. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era:
On the “Fragmentation” of International Law, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007)
(analyzing “fragmentation” in doctrinal terms). There are exceptions, most
notably, Gunther Teubner, who has argued that fragmentation reflects debates between normative communities, a conceptualization that this paper
echoes. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 5 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 999 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 449–53 (2003) (describing the role of domestic
judge-made doctrines as contributing to fragmentation).
4. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the
ILC, 19 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 157 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534086 (discussing the technical approach of the International Law Commission); Karel Wellens, Fragmentation
of International Law and Establishing an Accountability Regime for International
Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1159 (2004) (suggesting a broader role for the International Court of Justice). Many approaches to fragmentation are primarily concerned with how
different adjudicatory bodies should treat the decisions of other bodies and
deal less with the substantive disagreement between those bodies than with
the types of deference or comity they should show each other. These approaches arguably remain agnostic about the nature of the disputes in question.
5. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 970 (2004) (“On the positive side, however, the inter-
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their differences, international actors portray themselves in
much this way, as all beholden to the same traditional rules of
international law. Human rights bodies and advocates describe new rules in traditional terms; “instant custom” is explained in terms of state practice and opinio juris.6 International courts hew closely to the structure of the doctrine of
sources in their opinions, even when the rules they identify
seem difficult to defend in those terms. And scholars of
Global Administrative Law are careful to note that under the
traditional doctrine of sources, many of the private rule-making systems they study are not international law at all.7
But what if these assumptions are wrong? What if fragmentation reflects disagreements that run far deeper than
even the actors themselves are ready to admit? This Article
argues that rote statements of fealty to the doctrine of sources
actually mask inherent disagreements over the nature and
source of legal obligations. In an earlier article,8 I argued that

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 6 Side B
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national legal system is denser, more active, and arguably more important
than ever before.”); Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International
Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 448 (2008) (“It is entirely possible that,
after an initial period of competition in a particular substantive area, coherent rules will emerge.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 366 (2006) (“Competing
jurisdictions among courts, as well as academic criticism of introverted domestic judgments disregarding the international obligations of the country
concerned, may contribute to improving the quality and overall consistency
of judicial reasoning.”); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 959, 967–68 (2009) (discussing the benefits of cross-interpretation).
6. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 762
(2001) (describing the problem of instant custom and suggesting a way to
reconcile it with international law doctrine).
7. Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
973 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187
(2006); Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration]; Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A
Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
8. Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine
of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65 (2007).
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9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–92 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” rules).
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the traditional doctrine of sources had become outdated, that
a better description of the rules treated as law in the international system would strip away the formal categories of treaty,
custom, and general principles, and ask instead how and why
particular rules come to be treated as law. Drawing on compliance theory, I argued that rules come to be treated as international law in one of two ways: Either (1) the rule itself can be
internalized, or (2) the rule can be legitimated by agreedupon, internalized, law-making or process rules. The goals of
a revised doctrine of sources should be to identify the internalized legitimacy rules of the system and test suggested “laws”
against them.
Refocused through this lens, fragmentation begins to look
different. Instead of debates over doctrine, many of these debates look instead like debates over the very processes and
principles necessary for law creation. This Article looks at
three areas that have challenged traditional interpretations of
international law: (1) human rights, (2) global administrative
law, and (3) the law applied by international tribunals. It argues that in each, new views of legitimate rulemaking appear
to be emerging. A single international law community is being
replaced by separate, overlapping legal communities with significantly different views of law and legitimacy. In H.L.A.
Hart’s terms,9 these diverging communities no longer share
the same secondary rules. This Article tries to identify the
emerging legitimacy rules in each of these diverging communities.
Recognizing that these debates are debates between legal
communities rather than within one transforms attempts to resolve them. To the extent that debates between human rights
and international humanitarian law or trade law and the environment represent debates over legitimacy rather than conflicts over interpretation, doctrinal fixes will never fully resolve
them. Such debates must instead be viewed as true conflicts of
law; resolutions must mediate between the overlapping demands of different legal communities. In a sense, viewing conflicts over international law this way recasts the fragmentation
within international law as part of much larger problems in
transnational governance. Alongside the problem of fragmen-
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tation within international law, scholars have also struggled to
reconcile international law with a range of competing transnational and national legal systems, transnational regulatory networks, and private international organizations.10 Methods
used to describe and resolve those conflicts, for example, legal
pluralism,11 may be used on conflicts within international law
as well.
The Article will proceed in three parts. Part II argues for
a fresh look at the doctrine of sources of international law. Its
approach is multi-theoretical, finding the ingredients of this
new account already present in a series of theories aimed at
how international law works, when and why states and other
actors comply, and the nature of law. Each suggests an account of international law doctrine that does not completely
comport with the traditional doctrine of sources. Tying

R
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10. Perhaps confusingly, conflicts between these different regimes, of
which Medellı́n between the United States and the ICJ, Yahoo! between
France and the United States, and possibly Kadi between Europe and the
UN, are all high-profile examples, are also sometimes referred to as fragmentation. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law
Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1151, 1183 (2008) (discussing fragmentation in the context of Medellı́n); Carmen Draghici, Suspected
Terrorists’ Rights Between the Fragmentation and Merger of Legal Orders: Reflections
in the Margin of the Kadi ECJ Appeal Judgment, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 627, 629 (2009) (“The significant shift in jurisprudence signaled by the
Kadi judgment is the starting point for new reflections on the fragmentation
and merger of the legal phenomena in the post-modern world, and on the
place of human rights and the rule of law principle in the value system of the
international community.”); Andreas L. Paulus, The Legitimacy of International
Law and the Role of the States, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1052, 1054–55 (2004)
(reflecting on Yahoo! and fragmentation); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159–60 (2007) [hereinafter
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism] (discussing the three cases); Ruti Teitel,
Humanity Law: A New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 667 (2008) (same). These conflicts, however, arise from self-consciously different legal regimes, and although they may reflect the “fragmentation” of regulation, they do not undermine the uniformity of international
law itself. Such conflicts are probably better termed “competition” rather
than “fragmentation.” Kadi is the one exception, straddling the line between a traditional conflict between two regimes, the E.U. and international
law, and one within international law itself.
11. See, e.g., Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10; Paul Schiff
Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301
(2007) [hereinafter Berman, Pluralist Approach]; Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict
of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105
(2005) [hereinafter Berman, Conflict of Laws].
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12. Although in truth, they may not see it that way. Arguably, at least in
the human rights context, the goal is to apply those new norms of legitimacy
to international law as a whole.
13. See Kammerhofer, supra note 4; Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69, 98
(2009) (using U.N. Charter as trump in disputes).
14. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International
Law as a Universe of Inter-connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 904 (2004)

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 8 Side A

threads together from these various theories, this Part suggests
that international law should best be seen as a combination of
two sets of rules. The first set includes rules, both substantive
and procedural, that are directly internalized by international
actors. Among other things, these internalized rules define
the standards of legitimacy against which future rules are to be
judged. The second set includes rules adopted and legitimated through processes laid out in the first set of rules.
Part III describes three areas of international law that
pose problems for the traditional doctrine of sources: (1)
Human rights law, where actors seem to have coalesced
around rules regarding customary international law, treaty interpretation, and reservations that appear to be in tension with
more traditional doctrine, (2) tribunal-centered law, in particular, international criminal law and trade/investment law,
where despite protestations to the contrary, precedent seems
to be taking a central role, and (3) global administrative law,
where public law principles seem to be taking hold in the absence of any traditionally binding international law. Part III
then looks at each through the lens of a revised doctrine of
sources, asking what appear to be the legitimate lawmaking
rules that undergird each area. Part III concludes that in each
area, a specific normative-legal community has refashioned
the legitimacy rules of the system, in essence seceding12 from
the unified vision of the traditional doctrine of sources.
Part IV explores the ramifications of taking this approach.
Many prior approaches to fragmentation have assumed that
the problem was primarily a jurisdictional one—with so many
bodies interpreting the rules and no appellate review, differences in interpretation were inevitable. Based on that assumption, those approaches sought doctrinal tie-breaker rules,13
doctrinal tweaks that could reconcile opposing rules, or jurisdictional management rules that suggest how courts should react to each other’s rulings.14 To the extent, however, that de-
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bates over international law rules can be traced to deeper conflicts over legitimate rule making, these solutions miss the
point. A doctrinal tweak may be able to paper over the differences, but given the depth of the underlying disagreements,
they are unlikely to stay long under wraps. A more lasting solution would have to recognize the different communities involved in disputes and the trade-offs between community interests at stake. This Part ends by suggesting and evaluating some
of the conflict rules that might be used.
II. A FRESH LOOK

AT THE

SOURCES

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most discussions of fragmentation start by looking at its
results, working from there to try to discover ways to lessen its
impact or to mediate disputes. They describe the symptoms
and manage their relief. This Article takes a different tack. It
starts by exploring the concept and the sources of international law in an effort to find the root causes of fragmentation.
The hope is that in finding the root cause we will better be
able to diagnose the disease.
A. Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources

R

09/04/2012 13:10:36

(arguing that “the specialized institutions should continue to make and enforce their specialized law, but in doing so they should also take account of
general international law and the law made in other institutions,” and concluding that “[i]f all fora were to follow this approach, fragmentation and
unity of international law could go hand in hand and, when it comes to lawenforcement, conflicting rulings could largely be avoided”); Martinez, supra
note 3, at 449–53; cf. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791 (1999) (considering a more robust role for the
ICJ in resolving disputes over international law).
15. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 20–25 (2d ed.
1912).
16. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38, Dec.
16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 379.

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 8 Side B

Given the constant conflicts over almost every aspect of
international law, the doctrine of sources’ stability over the
past hundred years is nothing short of remarkable. The list of
sources—treaties, custom, and general principles—catalogued
by Lassa Oppenheim in his 1905 treatise15 and eventually codified in the statutes of the Permanent Court of International
Justice16 and its successor the International Court of Justice
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(ICJ),17 continues to serve as the focal point for discussions of
international law. Students are taught to apply it,18 practicing
lawyers build their arguments around it, and scholars debate
its meaning. Together with a series of other traditional rules
like pacta sunt sevanda or rules regarding treaty interpretation,
these rules form the generally agreed upon core of international law doctrine.
The doctrine of sources plays a complex role in international law. It is at one time a purported description of the
rules followed by states, a rule of decision for international
courts, a catalogue of legitimate forms of international lawmaking, and a theory of international legal legitimacy. To
some, the doctrine of sources represents international law’s
“rule of recognition”19 or its “secondary rules”20 more generally. To be sure, debates abound over the meaning of almost
every aspect of the doctrine—how much practice must one see
to find a rule of customary international law, what counts as
practice, whose practice matters, what are “general principles”—but even in those debates the overall authoritativeness
of the doctrine goes unquestioned.
Given the centrality of the doctrine, it might seem strange
or presumptuous to question it here. But in reality, the doctrine’s authority rests on very thin ice. There are serious rea-

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 9 Side A
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17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
18. See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 56–57 (4th ed. 2001) (presenting the statute as a starting point of
instruction in an International Law casebook); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E.
NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 20–21 (2d ed. 2001)
(“An ordinary starting point for international lawyers from most any part of
the globe when thinking about the formal sources of international law is
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.”); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 232 (4th ed. 1994)
(quoting the statute and commenting that “[t]his list has significance not
only for tribunals but also for officials or scholars pursuing the inquiries described above”).
19. Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1072 n.208 (1999) (“Article 38 contains the functional
equivalent of rules of recognition recognized by Hart to be indispensable to
any legal system.”).
20. See, e.g., Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 275, 299 (2008) (“The secondary rules of the international legal order would thus be the sources doctrine.”).
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21. I make a fuller case in favor of rethinking the doctrine of sources in
Cohen, supra note 8.
22. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010) (arguing that a fuller notion of unilateral
intent and disregard of custom can be found in the history).

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 9 Side B

sons to doubt the continued accuracy of the traditional doctrine. Unlike a constitution, which might reflect an initial
commitment to certain lawmaking rules and serve as the authority for later laws in a particular system, the doctrine of
sources did not predate international law and is not the authority on which international lawmaking rests. Instead it is a
description, a snapshot of how international law appeared to
function at a particular moment in time, in this case, the turn
of the twentieth century. Much about both the world and international law has changed since then, and the continued accuracy of that picture cannot be assumed.
Of course, all of this is academic if contemporary international law actually looks like the description in article 38 of the
ICJ Statute. Supporters of traditional doctrine would likely argue that international practice has coalesced around the
sources, processes, and theories implicit or explicit in the doctrine of sources. Right or wrong at its inception, they might
argue, the doctrine has created reasonable expectations of
what the law is and imbued the international laws made
through its processes with a high degree of legitimacy. But
this does not appear to be the case.21 Changes in the international system and international legal theory have put enormous pressure on the doctrine. The massive influx of new
states into the system has put enormous pressure on the generalized consent envisioned by the doctrine’s description of customary international law. Retaining the doctrine has required
watering down notions of “general practice” and implied consent almost to a nullity.22 While one might reasonably have
looked for the state practice of the handful of European and
other “civilized” states listed by Oppenheim, looking at the
practice of two hundred seems impractical if not impossible.
Similarly, consent of the new states to the already existing
rules has had to be assumed or imagined, lest those rules immediately be called into doubt.
Scholars and practitioners have similarly struggled to reconcile the individual rights orientation of human rights law
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23. Roberts, supra note 6, at 764.
24. Id. at 762.
25. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 191–204 (2010).
26. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal
Law, 86 IND. L. J. 1063 (2011).
27. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 115, 157–59 (2005); Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State
Practice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 513 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
28. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 340 (2009) (“When pressed, however, positivists
struggle to reconcile this custom-based theory of jus cogens with actual state
practice.”).
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with the state-centric list of sources and to explain how customary human rights law prohibiting practices like torture can
be reconciled with significant state practice to the contrary.23
Rapidly developing norms in human rights,24 environmental
law,25 and international criminal law26 put pressure on a
description of custom that seems to require slow development.27 New phenomena—non-binding but authoritative
statements of international organizations, agreements between
sub-state units or actors, and the increasingly law-like nature of
rules adopted within corporate and NGO communities—are
stuffed into old doctrinal boxes; when they simply can’t fit,
they are defined out of international law. And it is difficult to
locate well-accepted notions of jus cogens and non-derogable
norms in the doctrine or to reconcile their existence with the
doctrine’s model of laws made through state consent.28
All these pressures on the doctrinal strength of the doctrine of sources have been mounting at a time when international legal theory seems to be moving away from the stateconsent-centric explanations of international law and away
from formal, top-down sources like treaty and custom. Increasingly trying to understand when and how states come to
comply with international law, theorists have increasingly eschewed analysis of formal legal rules, instead looking at dynamic processes of norm transfer or behavior shaping. Ignoring questions about state consent, these theorists and researchers instead look to other mechanisms—how embeddedness in
international regimes can encourage cooperation between
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29. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
30. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
31. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
32. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998).
33. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
34. See supra notes 29–33.
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states,29 how states and state officials come to be socialized into
a world community that emphasizes certain types of behavior,30 how transnational activist communities build cross-state
networks to push states to agree to and follow certain rules,31
how international law rules come to be internalized, shaped,
and enforced by domestic actors,32 or how international rules
are transferred between international networks of officials, bureaucrats, and judges.33 Rather than focusing solely on states,
these theorists increasingly look at the juris-generative activities of other actors—bureaucrats, judges, activists, interest
groups, NGOs, corporations, and civilians.34
Thus from both a practical and theoretical standpoint, it
seems that a fresh look at the sources of international law is in
order. But what would such a fresh look comprise? A good
place to start is to look at various theories that have arisen to
answer other questions about international law, including theories regarding compliance, theories designed to explain nontechnically legal phenomena like “soft law,” and theories designed to explain norm conflict across regimes like global legal
pluralism. Each holds hints at what actually counts as law in
the international system—ingredients for a new doctrine of
sources. There are, of course, dangers in transplanting observations from these theories to a theory of sources. One, for
example, should not equate when states comply with what
rules count as law. But looked at carefully, these alternative
theories can begin to illuminate the mechanisms through
which rules come to be seen as law at all.
Many of these theories focus on the ways in which norms
are transferred across the international system and internalized by states and other actors. Others of these theories focus
on when particular rules will be seen as more legitimate. In a
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prior article,35 I looked specifically at two such theories, Harold Koh’s Transnational Legal Process36 and Thomas Franck’s
Law as Legitimacy.37 I argued that read together, the two theories suggested that international rules come to be treated as
law in one of two ways. First, some rules will be directly internalized by international actors. Although some of these rules
will be substantive—states may internalize a prohibition on genocide or slavery, others which we might term “legitimacy
rules,” will focus more on process—they may explain what
counts as a binding agreement, what evidence is needed to legitimate a customary practice as law, or dictate when such an
agreement must be followed. Such legitimacy rules would include a combination of “process rules”—rules articulating the
process that must be followed to enact or change rules, and
“process values”—qualities rules must meet in order to be legitimate law.38 Essentially these internalized legitimacy rules
provide standards against which purported rules of international law will be judged.
A second category of rules treated as international law,
“legitimated rules,” builds on this first one. Rules in this category are treated as law because they meet the standard of internalized legitimacy rules. Thus, as an example, some human
rights may be treated as international law because those rights
have simply been internalized, while others may be treated as

R
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R
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35. Cohen, supra note 8.
36. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Koh, supra note 32.
37. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM.
J. INT’L L. 705 (1988).
38. In my prior article, I argued that these process values might include
qualities like determinacy, pedigree, coherence, and adherence that Franck
has identified as factors leading to “legitimacy pull.” Cohen, supra note 8, at
112–13. Such process values may also include factors associated with Lon
Fuller’s internal morality of the law. See JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE,
LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 25–26 (2010); Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public
Law, in NOMOS XLIX: MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167, 176
(Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law].
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39. Importantly, these need not be one-or-the-other choices: Some states
may treat a rule (e.g., prohibiting certain acts in war) as law because the rule
itself has been internalized while other states (which have not yet internalized the rule) may treat the rule as law because it is embodied in a treaty
adopted through a legitimate process (e.g., the Geneva Conventions). The
two categories are fluid: A rule not yet fully internalized might be given
extra legitimacy by process, and a rule initially treated as law because it was
created through a legitimate process, may over time be internalized.
40. Or, in other words, is there opinio juris?
41. Cohen, supra note 8.
42. HART, supra note 9.
43. Id. at 225–26.
44. Id. at 79–99. This also echoes observations of legal pluralists, see
Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323, and socio-legal positivism,
see generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurispru-
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international law because they’re embodied in a document
that meets internalized standards of legitimacy.39
Under the traditional doctrine of sources, the test applied
to any purported international law rule is a formal one—is it a
treaty, a custom, or a general principle of law? A revised doctrine of sources suggests a much more functional test. For any
given purported international law rule, the question will be
two-fold. First, has the rule itself been internalized/do actors
treat the rule as in itself legally binding?40 Second, if not, has
the rule been adopted through legitimate processes?
As I have explained in much greater depth elsewhere,41
such a reconceptualization has the advantages of more accurately capturing international practice, better capturing the
ways theory tells us rules come to be accepted as law, eliminating clumsy boundaries between treaty, custom, and other potential sources, and recognizing the dynamic nature of legal
rules, i.e., that the legal status of rules can change over time,
regardless of the form (treaty, custom, or something else) they
take. Even legitimacy rules can change over time. This reconceptualization also dovetails well with various broader theories
of law, in particular, that of H.L.A Hart.42 By looking beyond
the formal sources of Article 38, it echoes Hart’s sociological
approach to law. The question both here and for Hart is
which rules are treated as law as a matter of social fact.43 By
focusing on the internalization of norms, both substantive and
procedural, this revised doctrine echoes Hart’s emphasis on
the internal point of view—the requirement of law that it be
accepted as an obligation, not merely imposed by coercion.44
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But most of all, the relationship described in the revised doctrine between legitimacy rules and the rules adopted in accordance with them comes very close to Hart’s description of primary and secondary rules.45 Legitimacy rules play a similar
role to Hart’s secondary rules, defining when a rule will be
treated as law in the system. The main difference is that legitimacy rules capture not only the processes to be followed or
the sources to be looked at, but the normative justifications for
those choices as well.46
B. Rethinking the International Community
A full discussion and defense of how such revised doctrine
would be applied is beyond the scope of this Article and something I have written about at length in a previous article.47
The question here is whether such a revised doctrine can shed
light on the problem of normative conflict between subject areas of international law—a problem often attributed to the
fragmentation of international law.
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dence, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001) (adapting legal positivism to incorporate a wider variety of social practices into the concept of law).
45. This might appear ironic as Hart describes international law as primitive law on the basis of his perception that it lacked secondary rules. HART,
supra note 9, at 214.
46. Despite the surface similarity between the concept of secondary rules
as used by Hart and legitimacy rules used here, I have specifically chosen not
to use the former term. Secondary rules only refer to the function the rules
play in the system, not to the normative account underlying them—something legitimacy rules are meant to capture. Further, the two concepts do
not completely overlap: some procedural or adjudicatory rules which would
count as secondary rules under Hart’s formulation might not be internalized
legitimacy rules, but instead rules adopted through a legitimate process
themselves—take, for example, treaty provisions on dispute resolution
under that treaty regime. (Similarly, some rules that might be seen as primary rules under Hart’s formulation may actually be directly internalized
and not dependent on any other rule for their treatment as law.) Finally,
the term “secondary rules” is already in use in international law, often to
describe rules laid out in the traditional doctrine of sources. See, e.g., DIVERSITY IN SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–10
(L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn and K.C. Wellens eds., 1995) (associating Hart’s “rules
of recognition” with Art. 38 and associated international law doctrines); Petersen, supra note 20, at 299 (“The secondary rules of the international legal
order would thus be the sources doctrine.”). Avoiding confusion seems to
require a different term.
47. Cohen, supra note 8.
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48. Id. at 113–14.
49. See Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law
Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 172–73 (2007) (analyzing whether individuals have a role to play in providing evidence of customary international law).
50. Id. at 150 (“Missing throughout this foundational literature is both a
theoretical underpinning for the proposition that individuals should be recognized in CIL formation doctrine and a thorough consideration of how this
might be accomplished, both doctrinally and in practice.”).
51. See Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323 (“Such differentiations are less consequential in a pluralism context because the relevant
question is the normative commitments of communities, not the formal status of those commitments. If, after all, a statement of norms is slowly internalized by a population, that statement will have important binding force,
often even more so than a formal law backed by state sanction.”).
52. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1169.
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One of the questions raised but not answered in my earlier discussion of sources is who needs to internalize the rules
upon which international law is based. I did suggest that the
who could change over time and that the current legal community of international law may include actors other than just
states and their agents.48 This question is not unique to a revised doctrine of sources; similar questions have come up, for
example in the context of whose opinio juris should count in
looking for customary international law.49 Much of the time,
the answer is a bit fudged.50 But the question takes on added
importance under a revised doctrine of sources. To the extent
we need to look for the legitimacy rules of the system, we need
to know who has a say in what counts as legitimate, who gets to
judge the legitimacy of a particular rule.
Moreover, we have so far assumed that there is a single
international law community with a single set of legitimacy
rules. However, once the focus shifts away from form and to a
search for shared internalized rules, it becomes completely
plausible that one might find different communities with different internalized rules.51 As legal pluralists have long observed, “people belong to (or feel affiliated with) multiple
groups and understand themselves to be bound by the norms
of these multiple groups.”52 Legal communities can often
overlap, as they did in colonial societies where colonial and
indigenous law often lived side-by-side, vying for control.
These observations have been applied to a wide range of normative communities—the state, religion, business communi-
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ties, and even transnational regulation.53 There is no reason
to think that these observations could not be applied to international law as well.54 In that context, it could mean different
overlapping communities of states, e.g., European states or
maritime states, but it could also mean subject-specific communities that include actors other than states, e.g., regulators,
NGOs, individuals, and corporations. Depending on where we
look, depending on the actors we focus on, we may find different internalized legitimacy rules. As a result, we must ask not
only what the internalized legitimacy rules are but also who
makes up the relevant community.55
This is no easy task. For one thing, we need a better understanding of what it is we look for when we talk about “community” in this context. The term community is vague and
over-used; it seems deeply weighted with meaning yet utterly
abstract. What do we actually mean when we talk about relevant legal communities in this context? One helpful conceptualization can be found in the constructivist international relations literature, in particular, Emanuel Adler’s “communities
of practice.”56 As Adler explains, “[c]ommunities of practice
‘consist of people who are informally as well as contextually
bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.’”57 Such a common practice, “in turn, [is] sustained by a repertoire of communal resources, such as routines,
words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and dis-
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53. See generally id.
54. At times, Berman seems to suggest as such, but most of the examples
he looks at are between international law and other competitors, such as
state law, regional law, and transnational regulatory regimes.
55. Cf. Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323 (“As a result, instead of focusing solely on who has the formal authority to articulate norms
or the coercive power to enforce them, we can turn the gaze to an empirical
study of which statements of authority tend to be treated as binding in actual
practice and by whom.”) (emphasis removed).
56. EMANUEL ADLER, COMMUNITARIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2005). Thank you to
Jutta Brunée for pointing me to Adler’s work.
57. Id. at 15 (quoting William M. Snyder, Communities of Practice: Combining Organizational Learning and Strategy Insights to Create a Bridge to the 21st
Century, COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE LABS (Aug. 1997), http://www.co-i-l.com/
coil/knowledge-garden/cop/cols.shtml). Adler himself borrows the idea of
communities of practice from the work of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger on
education and learning theory. Id. at 15 n.116.
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course.”58 One key in this description of community is that it
does not require members to agree on everything—members
may disagree sharply on substance and desired outcomes; instead, it requires only that members accept a set of common
ground-rules for negotiation and contestation. Communities
of practice can come in various shapes and sizes; their boundaries “are determined by people’s knowledge and identity and
the discourse associated with a specific practice.”59 Some communities will be tightly organized, with small groups of practitioners who know each other well and engage with each other
regularly on a defined set of issues.60 Others will be much
more diffuse, with members who never meet and are connected only by their shared practices—practices they apply to
a broad range of activities.61 Members may also have different
relations to these communities. Some may be core members
who actively work to develop its rules and norms, while others,
farther from the core of the community of practice, may simply adopt, accept, or apply the results of that work.62
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58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Adler gives the example of U.N. weapons inspectors. Id. at 25.
61. Here, Adler uses the collective security community as an example.
Id. at 24–25.
62. “Communities of practice may be viewed as being composed of three
concentric circles.” Id. at 24. As Adler explains:
Practices are brought into existence in the first or inner circle. For
example, a look at cooperative security and the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the evolution of this practice shows that the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent normative injunctions and practices, such as CBMs, were developed in the inner circle of CSCE practitioners. In an
intermediate circle we find people, who, due to expertise or normative commitment, help diffuse the practice. This would include
CSCE experts, the Helsinki Human Rights groups, and European
political leaders, who assimilated cooperative practices, diffused
them more widely, and brought them to their respective domestic
systems. The outer circle is made up of those experts, practitioners, and activists who adopt and help implement such practices beyond their original functional or geographic boundaries. In our
case, that includes people from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process.
Id. at 24–25.
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63. See generally JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEINTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 13–16, 28
(2010).
64. ADLER, supra note 56, at 25; cf. Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
331, 349 (2009) (discussing “communities of interpretation and authority”).
65. ADLER, supra note 56, at 15.
66. Cf. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1171 (“Of course,
finding non-state forms of normative ordering is sometimes more difficult
outside the colonial context because there is no obvious indigenous system,
GALITY IN
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Adler’s description of common practice seems to capture
law and legal discourse well, and legal communities, as Jutta
Brunnée and Stephen Toope have observed,63 look like particularly good examples of communities of practice. Law provides a medium for debate and agreement, requiring actors to
engage with each other in very specific fora using very specific
language and procedures. The legal community, in turn, is
constituted by its members’ shared acceptance of certain
ground rules and their shared expectations about good and
bad arguments. As Adler observes, “[i]t is as members of communities of practice that people exercise one of the highest
forms of power: determining the meanings and discourses that
produce social practices.”64 The proposed structure of communities of practice, with concentric circles of core experts/
practitioners and more peripheral adopters, helps conceptualize the relationship in a legal community between the expert
lawyers who practice the law and the broader community of
stakeholders whose influence and involvement are weaker, but
whose broad acquiescence is still necessary.
Applied at the international level, such insights can begin
to explain international actors, and in turn, the practice of international law. “The closer we get to the level of practice, in
fact, the more we can take the international system as a collection of communities of practice; for example communities of
diplomats, of traders, of environmentalists, and of humanrights activists.”65 Conceptualizing community this way also
fits well with the process orientation of the alternative doctrine
of sources described above, capturing the way rules come to be
internalized by legal actors through legal practice.
Still, even if this helps in describing the sorts of communities in which law and legitimacy rules form, the exact shape of
such communities seems nearly impossible to discover.66
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Their overlapping nature, their ever-evolving membership,
and the fact that actors can be members of multiple (even conflicting) communities at the same time, makes drawing boundaries around them a hopeless task. What is important to focus
on here though are the very limited purposes for which the
term is being used. Drawing certain empirical observations
about the nature of rules in the system may not require a perfect description of the community.67 Even a rough approximation may still allow us to see developing norms of legitimacy. And in this case, the link between communities and legitimacy rules may provide the key.
Legitimacy rules might be seen as the most basic of common practices necessary for a legal community of practice.
Just as the membership of a particular community might suggest certain legitimacy rules, so too might the presence of certain legitimacy rules suggest in a very rough way the outlines of
the community that shares them.68 We might adopt a functional definition of the legal community as that group of actors whose judgment of a rule’s legitimacy is necessary for the
rule to act effectively as law.69 In other words, the community
is that set of actors who can effectively assert claims regarding
the legitimacy rules of the system.70 This very specific notion
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and the less formal ordering structures tend to ‘blend more readily into the
landscape.’ ”) (citing Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV.
869, 873 (1988)).
67. We might not need to know, for example, an exact list of members,
clear criteria for membership, or who patrols the communities’ boundaries,
all problematic questions on which other discussions of community often
founder. Of course, if we were to transform the legitimacy communities into
a legal category or give them doctrinal significance, such question would
take on new importance. See infra Part IV.B.
68. As Adler explains, “The negotiations about meaning that occur
within and between communities of practice eventually define the communities’ boundaries.” ADLER, supra note 56, at 27.
69. This dovetails well with Hart, who identified “efficacy” as a key element of law, and Fuller, who lists “congruence” among his factors of law’s
internal morality. HART, supra note 9, at 103–04; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (1961). On both accounts, it makes sense to link effectiveness with other indicia of legitimacy. This is not so much circular as it is a
demonstration of how the legal system works: Rules will be effective among
the group that judges them legitimate. Importantly, as an aside, effectiveness is not the same as compliance. See Franck, supra note 37, at 706–12;
Cohen, supra note 8, at 106–07.
70. Cf. supra text accompanying note 68.
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of a “legitimacy community” dovetails well with the functional
doctrine of sources described above, which focuses on internalized legitimacy rules and rules adopted pursuant to them.
The traditional doctrine of sources provides a good example of how such an analysis would work. The list of sources in
Article 38 arguably describes the processes of legitimate lawmaking and the standards of legitimacy in a community of sovereign states (the paradigmatic international law community
of the early twentieth century). States (or really, their agents)
would recognize law made through explicit treaties or practices sufficiently widespread and longstanding to be thought of
as obligatory.71 The standard against which the legitimacy of
laws appears to be measured in this community is state consent—either explicit in the case of treaties, or implicit in the
case of custom. Additional rules like the persistent objector
exception further emphasize the importance of state consent.
The question remains whether these legitimacy rules can best
describe contemporary international law and its specific subfields, a question that will be taken up by the next part.
III. NO LONGER UGLY DUCKLINGS: APPLYING
DOCTRINE OF SOURCES

THE

REVISED

09/04/2012 13:10:36

71. General principles are harder to describe because they are harder to
define. General principles might simply have been gap-filling rules for international tribunals, which states had accepted as legitimate for those purposes. Or they could be sources of legal obligation in their own right, in
which case the argument would be that states accepted the legitimacy of
rules derived from municipal practice when those practices were sufficiently
common to states in the community.
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Under the revised doctrine set out above, what counts as
law internationally is a function of what a particular international community accepts as legitimate lawmaking. The corollary to that observation is that an international legal community is defined by the rules of legitimate lawmaking that it
shares. This suggests two somewhat radical possibilities: First,
that in various areas of international law the legitimate sources
of law may no longer be those listed in article 38 of the ICJ
statute, and second, that disagreements over the legitimacy of
particular sources may mean that international law is no
longer defined by a single legal community.
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This section applies these lessons to three areas that have
put pressure on traditional sources doctrine: (1) international
human rights law, (2) tribunal law (i.e., the law applied in areas of international law dominated by adjudication or arbitration), and (3) Global Administrative Law. It takes a fresh look
at some of the doctrinal difficulties these areas have produced
and explores whether evolving communities and changing legitimacy rules may be able to explain them. It asks whether a
revised doctrine of sources can bring clarity to practices in
those areas that the traditional doctrine only obscured.
Finding the hidden legitimacy rules in an area of law is an
undoubtedly difficult task. Because the traditional doctrine of
sources is still perceived to be at the core of international practice and adjudication, actors strain to make their arguments in
the language of the doctrine of sources. Figuring out what is
really going on is thus probably impossible. The point here is
not to catalogue the hidden legitimacy rules in each area, but
instead merely to show that something appears hidden, that
traditional arguments may be mere masks disguising the real
concerns within a particular community.
A. Human Rights

09/04/2012 13:10:36

72. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 ¶¶ 186–202 (June 27) (minimizing the importance of instances of state practice and focusing almost entirely on tradi-
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Human rights might be thought of as international law’s
problem child. Human rights law constantly challenges traditional international law doctrine. Many of the most persistent
challenges to the traditional doctrine of sources have come
from human rights bodies, experts, advocates, and scholars.
Three particular challenges stand out: (1) the possibility of
“instant custom,” or custom based on little or no state practice,
(2) the relevance of various non-traditional sources to the
search for custom, and (3) the treatment of reservations and
other attempts to limit the effects of treaties.
The question of how much state practice, practiced for
how long, is necessary before a rule can properly be called customary international law is a well-worn one in international
law. Claims that little or no state practice may suffice are not
exclusive to human rights; in fact, they had their origins in
other areas.72 But these questions have become central with
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tional sources of opinio juris to find customary international law); North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20)
(recognizing the possibility that even rare state practice may support finding
customary international law); Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer
Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965)
(arguing that state practice simply serves as evidence of opinio juris in identifying customary international law).
73. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 758.
74. Onuma Yasuaki, Is the International Court of Justice an Emperor Without
Clothes?, 8 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 22 (2002). Onuma adds that the term
“clearly reveals how inappropriate and outdated it is to think of general international law within the framework of Article 38.” Id.
75. Roberts, supra note 6, at 758.
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regard to human rights. In human rights law, it is common to
find arguments, as well as decisions by international bodies,
suggesting rules of customary international law even in the
face of widespread state practice to the contrary. Torture is
the most widely cited example. It is also common to see arguments that custom can emerge very quickly, almost instantaneously, following the widespread ratification of multilateral
human rights treaties or a series of declarations from the
United Nations General Assembly or other international bodies. Scholars, advocates, and judges have all argued explicitly
or implicitly that what matters most with regard to human
rights law is what states say their obligations are—traditional
evidence of opinio juris.73 It is through this change in emphasis
that human rights law has recognized a broad range of rights
and rules that states continue to violate and which other states
do little to stop.
Such views seem to be in tension with traditional international law doctrine. As Onuma Yasuaki has observed, “The
term [instant custom] itself is, of course, a contradiction.”74
Custom by its nature implies some reasonably widespread, reasonably longstanding state practice. As Anthea Roberts has explained, traditional custom “focuses primarily on state practice
in the form of interstate interaction and acquiescence. Opinio
juris is a secondary consideration invoked to distinguish between legal and nonlegal obligations.”75
But the conflicts over custom do not end there. Another
major point of disagreement is over the proper sources of either state practice or opinio juris. Scholars, advocates, and
judges operating on the field of human rights have expanded
the notion of state practice to include state statements, includ-
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ing votes for General Assembly resolutions, and have mined
new sources of opinio juris, in particular, the opinions of national courts.76 The use of the latter seems particularly questionable from the perspective of the traditional doctrine of
sources. First, states are traditionally the legal actors in the
system and it is their opinion on whether a rule is legally binding that matters. It is unclear that domestic courts are really
reflective of that view (unless of course, they hinge their decision on the perceived position of their state); they certainly
aren’t acting as agents of the state.77 Second, even if the decisions of national courts evidence a belief by those courts that a
particular rule is legally binding, under traditional doctrine,
one would have to be very careful that the court was speaking
of international obligation—that the rule was binding between
states—rather than merely of domestic obligation—that the
rule was binding under the state’s constitution.
Human rights law also poses challenges to treaty law.
Under traditional doctrine, states are only bound by treaty
provisions that they agree to.78 Accordingly, when a state adds
a reservation to a treaty, it will not be bound by the reserved
provision. Either its counterparty states fail to object and the
reserving state is bound by only those provisions that it has
agreed to, or its counterparties object, in which case, if there’s
no further agreement, there is no treaty at all. This rule follows the general legitimating norm underlying traditional doc-

R
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76. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 230 (2003); Mary Ann Torres, The
Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: A
Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105, 109 (2002); Onuma, supra
note 74, at 19. (“Actually, most of these ‘customary’ norms have been posited by leading international lawyers in their treatises or textbooks. These
international lawyers relied heavily on the acts and statements of the executive branch of the government, domestic laws, and domestic court decisions
as major materials of state practice. Basically, the same materials have been
used as evidence of opinio juris.”).
77. See generally Philip M. Moreman, National Court Decisions as State Practice: A Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 259, 264
(2006) (arguing that national court decisions can be a deceptive indication
of state practice given inconsistencies between national court decisions and
practice of other state organs).
78. Reservations to the Convention on the Punishment and Prevention
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) (“It
is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without
its consent . . . .”).
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79. Id. at 26.
80. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 24:
Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the
Covenants or the Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under
Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov.
4, 1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,459d17822,459d
17ef2,453883fc11,0.html.
81. Id.
82. Id.

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 17 Side A

trine—state consent. Multilateral treaties, however, make
things more complex. Questions arise about the effect of reservations where some, but not all parties to the treaty object.
In its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ held that the treaty would not be in force between a reserving state and any state that objected to the reservation, but would be in force—minus the reserved provision—
between the reserving state and non-objecting states.79
But these rules have been challenged with regard to
human rights treaties. Arguments have been made that states
should simply not be allowed to include reservations that violate the objects and purposes of the treaty. Taking the argument one step further, the Human Rights Committee, a body
of experts established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, has asserted that it is it, and not the
other state parties, who should determine whether a reservation invalidly violates the Covenant’s objects and purposes.
Describing the acceptance or rejection of reservations as an
“inappropriate task for States parties in relation to human
rights treaties,” the Committee explained that “[i]t necessarily
falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.”80 “Because of the special character of a human rights
treaty, the compatibility of a reservation with the object and
purpose of the Covenant must be established objectively, by
reference to legal principles, and the Committee is particularly
well placed to perform this task.”81 In a direct challenge to
traditional doctrine’s reliance on state consent, the Committee went one step further, announcing that an invalid “reservation will generally be severable” and that accordingly, states
who attempt an invalid reservation will be held bound to the
entire treaty including the part they sought to reserve.”82 This
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83. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26:
Continuity of Obligations, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1
(Dec. 8, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883f
de.html.
84. See generally Roberts, supra note 6 (proposing a theory that can reconcile “modern” and “traditional” custom and describing prior attempts by
other scholars).
85. For a similar argument that disagreements over human rights law actually represent differences regarding governing secondary rules, see
Monica Hakimi, Secondary Human Rights Law, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 596 (2009).
86. State-to-state enforcement arguably would not be effective. Harlan
Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work? A Constructivist Expansion, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 636, 656 (2009) (“Human rights advocates seem well
aware of the weaknesses of state-to-state enforcement in that area. As a result, human rights treaties have increasingly adopted mechanisms specifi-
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assault on state consent is echoed in the Committee’s rejection
of the right of withdrawal from the Covenant.83
All three of these challenges are serious, raising questions
that go to the very core of international law. Nonetheless, they
are generally treated as doctrinal or technical challenges.
What is the correct interpretation of article 38’s requirements
of general practice and opinio juris? How should reservations
work in a multilateral context? The question is who has the
doctrinally correct position or whether the two positions can
be reconciled in some way.84
But the differences between human rights and other areas
of international law seem to run deeper than that, and the
revised doctrine of sources above suggests a different explanation. Each difference seems to cut to the heart of what makes
international law legitimate at all. They suggest that a separate
legal subcommunity is forming in human rights, one that has
very different understanding of legitimate rulemaking than
the traditional state-only community.85
There are strong reasons to think that human rights law is
no longer judged by a community made up solely of states.
First, by creating laws deliberately designed to intercede between states and their populations, to limit what states can do
to their own peoples, states have necessarily given up their monopoly over the shape of human rights law. Human rights law
limits states; it cannot be that whatever states do is the law.
Moreover, human rights law simply isn’t state-to-state law. As I
have argued elsewhere, human rights treaties are specifically
designed to avoid relying on state-to-state enforcement.86 In-
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stead they are consciously designed to reach inside states, to
empower individuals and populations, and to provide a focal
point for national and transnational advocacy.87 In some
cases, human rights law goes even farther, giving individuals
direct access to international institutions. The result is that
states simply cannot control the arguments made about the
law and cannot control the law’s eventual shape and direction.
In essence, in human rights, states have (perhaps reluctantly)
invited others into the international legal community.
To put it in community of practice terms, the community
of human rights law now seems to include individuals in direct
and indirect ways, sometimes as active practitioners and sometimes as passive participants. A small, but increasing, number
of individuals who participate directly by pursuing their own
human rights claims are joined by NGOs, human rights activists, and experts who claim to represent the interests of individuals. Pressing their claims in various formal and informal
fora, both groups have begun to shape broader popular views
and expectations on what human rights require and how they
work.88
The recognition that states are no longer the sole members of the relevant community can be found in both the
Human Rights Committee’s general comment regarding the
right of states to withdraw from the convention89 and the Inter-American Commission’s discussion of its jurisdiction over
32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 18 Side A
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cally directed as transnational advocacy groups, domestic constituencies, and
individual claimants.”).
87. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (arguing that human rights are
most effective in states with active civil societies and institutions).
88. In discussing related issues regarding the laws of war, Kenneth Anderson lists:
NGOs; the Security Council; other organs of the United Nations
such as the Human Rights Council and its dependencies such as
certain special rapporteurs; the activist-scholars who make up what
we may call the ‘visible college’ of international law; public intellectuals of several fields, through books, journals, and the media; national or regional courts, not specialized as such in law of armed
conflict but called upon to interpret it; and international criminal
tribunals of all types, their staffs, and the staffs particularly of the
prosecutors’ offices.
Anderson, supra note 64, at 349–50.
89. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26:
Continuity of Obligations, supra note 83.
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human rights violations in Cuba.90 In both cases, the human
rights body explained that once a state ratified a treaty, its provisions belong to the people.91 It doesn’t appear to be a far
leap to suggest that those people also have a say in assessing
the legitimacy of rules adopted.
As the membership of the community 92 of human rights
law changes, arguments within that community over its basic
norms—in particular its legitimacy rules—might be expected.
Although each of the doctrinal positions developing with
human rights remains controversial, they do suggest a consistent, alternative vision of legal legitimacy within that community. In contrast to the traditional doctrine of sources’ focus

R

R
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90. INTER-AM. COMM’ N H.R., 2006 Annual Report, ch. IV, ¶ 54 (Mar. 3,
2007) (“[I]t was not the intention of the Organization of American States to
leave the Cuban people without protection. That Government’s exclusion
from the regional system in no way means that it is no longer bound by its
international human rights obligations.”) (citing INTER-AM. COMM’ N H.R.,
2002 ANNUAL REPORT, ch. IV, ¶ 7.a (Mar. 7, 2003)).
91. Id. As the U.N. Human Rights Committee explained:
The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living
in the territory of the State party. The Human Rights Committee
has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing
practice, that once the people are accorded the protection of the
rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory
and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment in more
than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the
State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the
Covenant.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, supra note 83, ¶ 4.
92. As mentioned above, it is notoriously difficult to define the exact
membership of these communities, and many of those who talk of juris-generative communities beyond the state choose to leave their membership
fuzzy. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L.
REV. 311, 478 (Dec. 2002) (explaining “that space and community affiliation
can never be ‘given’ and that the process of their sociopolitical construction
must always be considered”); Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 3, at
1006 (“The primary motor for this development is an accelerated differentiation of society into autonomous social systems, each of which springs territorial confines and constitutes itself globally.”). One might define membership by who “makes” the law in an area, but such a definition requires a
further definition of what it means to “make” the law. The functional definition of the legal community here, which may or may not be satisfying, is that
group of actors whose judgment of a rule’s legitimacy is necessary for the
rule to act effectively as law.
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93. A similar argument could be made about the concept of “human dignity” in human rights law. “Human dignity” appears to be replacing “state
sovereignty” as the touchstone against which potential rules of international
human rights law are judged, suggesting that it too may be emerging as a
legitimacy rule within that community. In other words, potential human
rights rules are increasingly judged legitimate or not based on how well they
uphold human dignity.
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on state action, this alternative vision seems to focus on state
promises. Traditionally, state promises were meaningless if
not backed up by state action. Hypocrisy could not create custom. The new legitimacy rule emerging in human rights
seems to be that state promises matter and that the state cannot vitiate those promises merely through state action to the
contrary. 93
Such a rule also seems to cut through distinctions between custom and treaty. The exact form of a state promise is
less important than its solemnity and seriousness. Human
rights treaties, votes on general assembly resolutions, nonbinding declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights or the Helsinki Final Accords are all publicly directed
promises to respect certain rights. Such a rule clearly seems to
be operating with regard to “instant” custom and helps explain
the trend toward emphasizing traditional evidence of opinio
juris over state practice. States simply cannot promise not to
torture and then keep the promise from being binding by
breaking their promises and torturing. But it also might explain the Human Rights Committee’s views on reservations
and withdrawals. In a sense, ratifying a human rights treaty
might be seen as a particularly public promise to respect the
rights therein. Reservations, which are often either highly
technical or hard to interpret, might be seen as “sneaky” ways
that states try to avoid the full effects of those promises. In
essence, reservations are like states crossing their fingers behind their backs. The Human Rights Committee seems unwilling to accept such behavior. The same could be said of the
Committee’s view of withdrawals. Once a state makes a promise to its people through a human rights treaty, those people
become stakeholders in that treaty. As members of the community, they must have some say in whether a state can relieve
itself of those obligations.
There are reasons to think that individuals and their advocates, as new members of the community, might demand such
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B. Tribunal Law

09/04/2012 13:10:36

The worst kept secret in international law is that international tribunals rely on precedent. Of course, the reason it’s
kept a secret at all is that under the traditional doctrine of
sources, prior decisions are only a subsidiary source of interna-

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 19 Side B

rules. For one thing, state promises, whether in the form of
resolutions, treaties, or something else, are often made for
public consumption and are often directed to the broader
public. That individuals would want to hold states to these
promises is unsurprising. Moreover, asking individuals to
weigh those statements against state actions or against complicated state caveats like reservations may be unrealistic. Individuals, unlike states, do not have the resources or expertise to
monitor states in that way. They may demand a level of transparency beyond what states demand amongst themselves.
Such concerns may also explain the reliance on new sources of
evidence. The public resolutions of international bodies are
certainly more accessible to individuals than the specifics of
state practice, much of which may be purposely hidden from
view. But court opinions can be seen in this way as well. Court
opinions are much more transparent than state action. Courts
also provide individuals with a forum to make arguments
about the law’s content, a means of holding states accountable
for their promises, and direct access to the law’s development.
None of this is meant to suggest that this view is uncontroverted, even within the human rights community. That community is complex and along with scholars, advocates, and experts, it also includes states and their agents. Although many
state actors may agree with the cosmopolitan drift in human
rights law, others may be quite sensitive and hostile to new legitimacy rules that they cannot control. This sensitivity is, of
course, heightened by traditional doctrine’s conception of a
unitary international legal order. States may be legitimately
concerned that if new rules are recognized as valid doctrine in
human rights, nothing in traditional doctrine would keep
them from being recognized for other areas of international
law like international humanitarian law or trade. This hesitance, however, only highlights the tensions between the overlapping communities of international law.
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tional law.94 They are not meant to take the place of other
sources, treaties, custom, or general principles, but merely to
serve as evidence of them.95 While complaints have been
lodged against the ICJ and other bodies for using precedent in
lieu of other more legitimate sources,96 such statements are
almost taken for granted in international criminal law and investment arbitration.97
R

R
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94. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17, art.
38(1)(d).
95. See id. art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also
Martinez, supra note 3, at 482 (“[E]ven within a single international court
there is often no system of binding precedent and no doctrine of stare decisis.”) (emphasis omitted).
96. See, e.g., Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and
Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Disputes Only or
Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 221, 230
(2003) (“If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without hesitation that large amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settlement system.”); Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief,
there is a body of international common law of trade emerging as a result of
adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body. We have yet to recognize, much
less account for, this reality in our doctrinal thinking and discussions.”).
97. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ¶ 129 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), reprinted in 6 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE
L. 419, 571 (2006) (“In international and international economic law—to
which investment arbitration properly belongs—there may not be a formal
‘stare decisis’ rule as in common law countries, but precedent plays an important role. Tribunals and courts may disagree and are at full liberty to
deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and
should not respect well-established jurisprudence.”); Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611–12 (2005)
(“The fact is that investment awards are not technically precedential . . . . As
a practical matter, however, private investors, governments, and arbitral
tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment treaties.”); Matthew Belz, Comment, Provisional Application of the Energy
Charter Treaty: Karassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application
in Multilateral Treaties, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 727, 752 (2008) (“Second,
there is strong pressure on arbitrators to follow other tribunals’ decisions,
even though stare decisis does not govern international arbitration. As stated
by one ECT scholar, ‘[t]he reasoning of almost all modern arbitral awards
demonstrate [sic] the great care investment arbitral tribunals apply to ensure they are positioned in the mainstream of emerging jurisprudence.’ ”).
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Still, few argue that this development represents a shift in
the authoritative sources of international law. Critics, of
course, argue that international criminal tribunals have overreached in finding customary international law on the basis of
a few post World War II cases. They seem to suggest that
judges on those courts are incompetent, lazy, or legislating an
agenda from the bench.98 At worst, the reliance on precedent
threatens the legality principle, finding criminal liability on
the basis of a few long-forgotten decisions. Defenders of the
tribunals, on the other hand, argue that judges are being true
to traditional doctrine. They argue that judges either are careful and responsible in applying customary international law99
or that the cases cited are good evidence of state practice and
opinio juris.100 They may argue that general practice is a broad
enough concept to include judicial practice, e.g., court decisions,101 or that judicial opinions may reflect opinio juris.102
Looking at these courts and tribunals through the lens of
the revised doctrine of sources suggested reveals a different set
of explanations. Judges operating in areas of international law
that are particularly oriented towards adjudication may have
good reasons, beyond laziness, incompetence, or advocacy to
rely on precedent. For one, they may simply need precedent
R

R
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98. Bhala, supra note 96, at 914 n.214 (“The judge may refer to a precedent because he is impressed by the authority of the prior court, because he
is persuaded by its reasoning, because he is too lazy to think the problem
through himself, because he does not want to risk reversal on appeal, or for
a variety of other reasons.”).
99. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 821 (2005) (“[I]nternational criminal tribunals have taken an essentially conservative and traditional approach to the
identification and application of customary international law principles.”).
100. Cf. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp., supra note 97, at 571 (“The role
of precedent has been recognised de facto in the reasoning style of tribunals, but can also be formally inferred from Art. 1131 (1) of the NAFTA—
which calls for application of the ‘applicable rules of international law’;
these include, according to Art. 38 of the statute of the International Court
of Justice: ‘International custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as
law’ and ‘judicial decisions’ as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.’ ”).
101. See, e.g., Moreman, supra note 77 (discussing the role of national
court decisions in the formation of state practice).
102. See, e.g., Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 76, at 230 (“[T]he opinio juris
element . . . may be inferred from court decisions.”).
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103. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 188–91 (2010) (explaining how the imprecision of investment treaties necessarily shifts interpretive
power to investment tribunals).
104. See id. at 179–80 (“The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention) provides that the treaty parties’ subsequent agreements and practice shall be taken into account in interpretation. . . . Yet
investor-state tribunals have tended to shun this interpretive approach, apparently because of concerns about ensuring equality of arms between claimant investors and respondent states and protecting against the adoption by
states of self-interested interpretations.”).
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in order to do their jobs.103 Judges need (or at least want)
neutral sources that they can use to legitimate their decisions.
Normally, custom might provide such a source. In both international criminal law and investment arbitration, however, custom’s traditional ingredients—state practice and opinio juris—
seem anything but neutral.104 Take international criminal law.
Although it may be possible to find widespread state practice
and opinio juris on the broadest questions of international
criminal law—e.g., the broad contours of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes—that almost certainly cannot be the case with the more refined liability issues that tribunals are forced to decide. Few states are going to have state (as
opposed to judicial) practice with regard to the mens rea for
international crimes, the exact scope of liability for each, etc.
In reality, only two types of states are really going to have state
practice relevant to the legal issues that tribunals are forced to
decide: (1) states that have prosecuted international crimes
and (2) states that have committed them. Tribunals are quite
obviously going to avoid relying on the latter, but the former
are problematic as well. The arguments of prosecuting states
can be assumed to be at least as biased as a prosecutor’s argument about law in the domestic criminal context—and no one
would suggest that the arguments of prosecutors should simply
be treated as law. Like domestic prosecutors, such states can
be assumed to argue for the interpretations most likely to win
conviction, rather than provide a neutral assessment of the legal landscape. In the absence then of any neutral state practice, the tribunals need another source. International or national judicial practice, which at least has weighed the arguments of the prosecutor states against the interests of the
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105. Kenneth Anderson makes a similar point, noting that “[n]ew and different communities of interpretation and authority, as we might call them,
have been emerging in the arena of the laws of war.” Anderson, supra note
64, at 349.
106. See discussion of Emanuel Adler and “communities of practice,”
supra notes 56–65.
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accused defendants, may seem like a more legitimate, more
appropriate source.
Moreover, as in the example of human rights, in international criminal law, states are no longer the only relevant legal
actors and stakeholders.105 For one thing, the relevant legal
community of international criminal law includes defendants
and victims, the rights of whom must be taken into account.
But that legal community, that “community of practice,”106
also arguably includes both judges and the lawyers who serve
as prosecutors and defense attorneys. Courts play a very different role in international criminal law than in other areas of
international law. In other areas of the law, courts play a peripheral role; most law is made, followed, interpreted, and
hashed out directly between states. Courts are central, however, to international criminal law. The primary paradigm and
function of international criminal law is the trial. In this context, the judge is no longer a neutral referee, but instead the
ultimate arbiter of international justice. It is the judge, not
states, who decides ultimate guilt or innocence. Lawyers too,
play a different role in international criminal law. Prosecutors
and defenders do not serve merely as extensions of states and
do not simply mouth state positions. Instead they play independent roles as officers of the court representing the interests of international justice or the interests of their clients.
The legitimacy of international criminal law will be judged not
only by states—the traditional community of international
law—but by defendants, victims, lawyers, and judges as well.
Including defendants, victims, and judges in the relevant
community helps explain the pull of precedent. Neither defendants nor victims can really rely on state practices to protect their interests. Defendants need a neutral source free
from the bias of the states who seek to prosecute them, and
victims need a neutral source free from the bias of the states
who abused them. Moreover, due process and fairness require
consistency in treatment from one case to the next—such con-
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sistency seems impossible without giving prior decisions precedential weight.107 The introduction of domestic criminal lawyers into the field has undoubtedly helped bring those concerns to the forefront.
A similar story can be told about international investment
arbitration. In that context, states have specifically agreed to
give individual investors a seat at the table. Those investors
now make up a part of the international investment law community and they along with states will judge the legitimacy of
arbitral decisions.108 In order for investors to take the
promises of arbitration seriously (and increase investment accordingly) they must believe that the rules that will apply to
those arbitrations will be neutral. To rely on state practice
alone to fill gaps in established law might appear biased.
States are, of course, one of the parties to these disputes. Both
investors and states (along with the lawyers who advise them)
also crave certainty and predictability.109 Contracts become
much easier for both sides to negotiate when they have a
clearer idea of the law that will apply. Precedent can play a
powerful role as a neutral, predictable source of law. It also
feeds into a feedback loop. As adjudication/arbitration becomes the norm, state-to-state settlements become less common. A growing body of precedent arguably means a diminishing store of state practice.110 To the extent that state prac-
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107. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 757–58 (2003)
(suggesting that use of precedent is necessary to avoid unfairly divergent
results for defendants and to uphold the universality of international criminal law); Asa W. Markel, The Future of State Secrets in War Crime Prosecutions, 16
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2007) (suggesting that the ICTY adopted a
policy of stare decisis as result of due process concerns of certainty and predictability).
108. Paul Berman seems to make a similar suggestion, describing international investment arbitration as an area in which “non-sovereign communities” are generating norms, and describing investment treaties as “empower[ing] private actors to develop international norms.” Berman, Pluralist
Approach, supra note 11, at 314–15.
109. For this reason, arguments for reform in investment arbitration often
include calls for greater reliance on precedent rather than less. See Franck,
supra note 97, at 1617–25 (arguing for investment arbitration court of appeals to establish clear precedents that arbitral tribunals can then follow).
110. Moreover, states arguably rely on those precedents. Paradoxically,
then, from the standpoint of traditional doctrine, state practice reflects judicial precedent rather than the other way around.
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tice becomes increasingly fleeting and marginal, the turn
towards adjudication/arbitration may actually make reliance
on traditional sources less legitimate.
From the perspective of the revised sources theory suggested here, reliance on precedent thus looks less like an error
and more like the emergence of a new set of legitimacy rules
within the communities of international criminal law and international investment law. Those communities, which now
include stakeholders and actors beyond just states, appear to
be grasping for something beyond state practice that can create legitimately neutral and predictable gap-filling rules. What
traditional notions of custom seem to lack in legitimacy, precedent seems to provide.
C. Global Administrative Law
A different sort of challenge to traditional international
law doctrine has emerged from the project of Global Administrative Law.111 As part of that project, scholars have begun to
document and study the wide variety of international regimes
that are increasingly seeking to regulate international commerce, trade, investment, among other areas, with rules that
look, and sometimes act, like binding law.112 Some of these
R

R

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 22 Side B
09/04/2012 13:10:36

111. See generally Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra
note 7 (setting out core concepts of Global Administrative Law); Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury et al., Emergence] (surveying
major issues and challenges in the field of Global Administrative Law).
112. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2.
The contemporary starting point is thus the rapidly changing pattern of transnational regulation and its administration, a pattern
that now ranges from regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire),
through formal self-regulation (such as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, businessNGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid publicprivate regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental standards of another country),
network governance by state officials (as in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
environmental policies to be followed by national export credit
agencies), inter-governmental organizations with significant but indirect regulatory powers (for example, regulation of ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol), and inter-governmental organizations with direct governance powers (as with deter-
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regimes, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its
dispute settlement body, are the formal product of treaties and
technically (and doctrinally) international law. Others, however, are more informal, including networks of government officials like the Basel Committee,113 hybrid public-private organizations like the Codex Alimentarius,114 and private organizations like the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO).115 Regardless of the de facto force their rules may exert, those rules are often not technically international law. 116
The rules adopted by these regimes are increasingly important and binding, but what has really garnered the attention scholars associated with Global Administrative Law are the
increasingly administrative-law-like procedures these regimes
have developed to enact these rules. What these scholars have
noted is that, in many of these regimes, as the authority and
bindingness of their rules has increased, so too has pressure to
follow certain rules of process. Moreover, “[t]hese demands,
and responses to them, are increasingly framed in terms that
have an administrative law character.”117 Among other things,
these regimes have been asked to grant stakeholders greater
participation in the decision-making processes and to make
those processes more transparent, to give reasons for their deminations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution system for trade conflicts).
R

R
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Id.
113. See Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 21 (“The agreements
are non-binding in legal form but can be highly effective.”); see also David
Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 287–91 (1998)
(describing the informal constitution and flexible internal organization of
the Basel Committee).
114. See generally Michael A. Livermore, Note, Authority and Legitimacy in
Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766 (2006) (discussing the administrative law
procedure of the Codex).
115. Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 22.
116. Id. at 16 (“[M]uch of the detail and implementation of such regulation is determined by transnational administrative bodies—including international organizations and informal groups of officials—that perform administrative functions but are not directly subject to control by national governments or domestic legal systems or, in the case of treaty-based regimes,
the states party to the treaty.”).
117. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2.
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cisions and allow for meaningful review, and to conform their
eventual regulations to standards of means-end proportionality.118
The ISO is a good example.119 The ISO issues “standards
and technical specifications for a vast array of products and
processes.”120 The ISO’s members are national standards bodies, some of which are made up of industry advocacy groups,
others are government agencies, while still others are made up
of some combination of the two.121 Technically, the ISO is a
voluntary organization, both in the sense that membership is
voluntary and that adherence to the ISO’s 15,000 plus standards is voluntary. In fact, though, its standards have become
increasingly binding, either because they’re costly not to follow in a globalized world, or because its standards have become safe harbors in both national laws and the Technical
Barriers to Trade agreement.122 As the force of the ISO’s standards have increased, so too has its reach. The ISO has begun
to move into areas beyond its original mandate, enacting standards in environmental management and corporate responsibility.123
Both of these trends have led to pushes for greater accountability, and the ISO has responded with a series of administrative-law-like responses. In addition to adopting considerable notice and comment rule-making, the ISO has
broadened participation and transparency by creating a liaison
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118. Id. (“These evolving regulatory structures are each confronted with
demands for transparency, consultation, participation, reasoned decisions,
and review mechanisms to promote accountability.”).
119. This discussion of the ISO is largely derived from Eran Shamir-Borer,
The Evolution of Administrative Law-Type Principles, Mechanisms and Practices in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (Oct. 4,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/
documents/EranShamir-Borer.ISOPaperfor100406.pdf.
120. Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 330 (2008).
121. Shamir-Borer, supra note 119, at 12–14.
122. Id. at 4–5; David A. Wirth, Compliance with Non-Binding Norms of Trade
and Finance, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 330, 338–41 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
(1995).
123. Shamir-Borer, supra note 119, at 3–4.
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124. Id. at 80.
125. Id. at 48–49.
126. Id. at 59–60.
127. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2.
128. Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at 190.
129. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The Concept of
‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law] (“If a claim to ‘law’ is made in applying
the label GAL in some of these situations, it is a claim that diverges from,
and can be sharply in tension with the classical models of consent-based inter-state international law and most models of national law.”).

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 24 Side A

membership for NGOs, a new code of ethics that requires
greater participation within the national member bodies,124
the creation of a fund to help smaller states participate more
effectively in standard making,125 and pilot programs to publish some of their regulations on the web.126
But the ISO is not alone. “The growing commonality of
these administrative law-type principles and practices is building a unity between otherwise disparate areas of governance.”127
Thus the WTO Appellate Body now requires . . .
member states to follow certain administrative procedures before excluding imports, the Basel Committee
of central bankers now puts out drafts of its proposals
for capital adequacy for wide comment before adopting them, the UN Security Council has adopted a limited review mechanism to make it possible for people
listed as terrorist financiers to be delisted, the World
Bank operates a notice and comment process before
adopting policies and has an Inspection Panel to
hear complaints that it has breached its policies, and
the International Olympic Committee follows an
elaborate procedure for athletes suspected of doping
and has a review process culminating in arbitration at
the International Court of Arbitration for Sport.128
The emergence of a global administrative law is difficult
to square with the traditional doctrine of sources. 129 Many of
these administrative-law-like rules are emerging in private or
public-private organizations and networks as opposed to statestate institutions. To the extent that there are neither states
nor treaties or custom involved, such rules are invisible to the
traditional doctrine of sources. These rules may be some-
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thing, but they are not international law.130 But even where
there is a formal treaty, as in the example of the WTO, doctrine may have trouble explaining the emergence of administrative law features. One commonly cited example of administrative process rules at the WTO was the dispute settlement
body’s requirement in the Shrimp/Turtle case that foreigners
be given adequate opportunities to participate in U.S. regulatory decisions.131 Scholars are quick to note though that such
a requirement is hard to find in any treaty or international
law.132 Moreover, even if emerging administrative law rules in
one regime could be traced to a particular treaty or to more
general principles of international law, dividing the category
between those rules dictated by international law and those
outside of it seems less than satisfying. To the extent to which
these administrative law rules seem to be emerging as part of a
common phenomenon (with different regimes borrowing
rules from each other), they seem to call out for a unified explanation or source.133
Viewing these emerging rules through the lens of “communities of practice”134 and a revised doctrine of sources
makes sense of the Global Administrative Law phenomenon.135 It appears that communities of practice are developing within and across particular regulatory regimes. The form
R
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130. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 5
(“This field of law is described as ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to reflect both the inclusion in it of a large array of informal institutional arrangements (many involving prominent roles for non-state actors), and its foundation in normative practices, and normative sources, that are not encompassed within standard conceptions of ‘international law.’ ”).
131. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 180–184, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998);
Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 36.
132. See also Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38,
at 190–91 (“It is influenced by treaties and fundamental customary international law rules, but it goes beyond these sources and sometimes moves away
from them.”).
133. See generally Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, supra note 129, at 26 (attempting to devise such an explanation).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 56–68.
135. Benedict Kingsbury suggests something similar, arguing for a concept of inter-public law that can replace inter-national law and that would
recognize various regulatory regimes alongside states as distinct legal communities subject to public law constraints. See generally Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at 190.
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of these regimes—legal, quasi-legal, or non-legal, national,
transnational, or international—is irrelevant. Instead, what is
relevant is the increasing law-like nature of the rules in the
area and the decreasing opportunities for exit. Both have led
stakeholders and other members of these communities to demand greater control and access to the decision-making
processes in these areas, often in the form of administrative
law type rules and procedures. New legitimacy rules seem to
be emerging, which requires some combination of participation, transparency, reason-giving, review, and proportionality
that can legitimate the rules in the eyes of the relevant community. The project of Global Administrative Law, much like
the project of the revised doctrine of sources, can be seen as
an attempt to document the internalized legitimacy rules in
each of these communities. Moreover, the communities of
state officials, lawyers, NGOs, and business interests in each of
these regimes overlap, helping to spread a particular toolbox
of procedures from one regime to the next. As actors begin to
internalize certain administrative law norms in one regime, it
becomes increasingly difficult for them to accept unreviewable, unreasoned, closed-door decisions made in other regimes—even if on paper, such decisions are completely legal.
D. The Diversity of International Legal Communities

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 25 Side A
09/04/2012 13:10:36

In each of the three areas discussed so far, human rights,
tribunal law, and global administrative law, new legal communities with new legitimacy rules seem to be emerging. In some
ways, the story behind each seems quite similar. Each area exemplifies the increasing specialization of international law;
new specialized bodies of law are increasingly applied by subject area specialists (some of whom may have been educated in
legal areas other than traditional public international law)
who represent groups and interests only recently affected by
international legal regulation. In such situations, we would expect views on substantive law and doctrine to diverge, but it
might also seem reasonable to expect the divergence of legitimacy rules that the above discussions suggest. As Adler explains, “[i]t is within communities of practice that collective
meanings emerge, discourses become established, identities
fixed, learning takes place, new political agendas arise, and the
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institutions and practices of global governance grow.”136 It is
through intense involvement with other participants in a particular regime that community specific understandings of law
and legitimacy begin to form. As constructivist international
relations scholars have taught, agents and structure, in this
case, law and legal actors, are mutually constituting. Deep engagement with human rights, international criminal lawyering,
international investment arbitration, or a transnational regulatory regime should be expected to shape the expectations and
understandings of its participants in ways different from nonparticipants.
But these three examples also demonstrate the diversity of
the shapes communities can take. In one example, tribunal
law, we see a community developing around a small group of
expert practitioners in a highly specialized area. The special
challenges created by the type of practice and its relative insulation from the rest of international law fuel the shift away
from old legitimacy rules toward new ones. In another area,
human rights, we see a much more diffuse community, with a
wide variety of different members—states, NGOs, experts, individuals—participating in different ways, with different levels
of influence, at different times, in different fora. Participants
are separated by geography, politics, training, and social circumstance; they are connected only by shared reference to
human rights language.137 Emerging legitimacy rules are
deeply and broadly contested. Finally, in the last area, global
administrative law, the legal community cuts across a variety of
subfields, as practitioners and advocates reach into other areas
in search of principles they can learn and borrow. The “community” is tacit (virtual?) at best—the product of relations,
connections, and mutual learning. The existence of the community only becomes apparent (perhaps even to participants)
upon academic description.
IV. FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS OF LAW
So far, this Article has sought to better understand the
nature of sources within international law. In so doing, it has
R
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136. ADLER, supra note 56, at 15.
137. Participants may also be connected through a sense of shared project.
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138. See, e.g., Milanovic, supra note 13, at 92 (relying on Article 103 of the
U.N. Charter as rule of norm conflict resolution); Roberts, supra note 6, at
758 (explaining the difference between traditional and modern custom);
Teitel & Howse, supra note 5 (suggesting “law of humanity” Grundnorm).
139. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation Report, supra note 2, at 211, ¶
419; see also Dupuy, supra note 14, at 801–02 (considering a more robust role
for the ICJ in resolving disputes over international law); Kammerhofer, supra
note 4 (describing such approaches).
140. See generally Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 INT’L L. & POL. 809
(1999).
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suggested that international law may no longer represent a single community of states with a single set of internalized legitimacy rules, but instead a series of overlapping communities
with overlapping members, each of which may be in the process of adopting a new set of internalized legitimacy rules. If
this account is at all persuasive, does it provide any lessons
about the “fragmentation” of international law or what to do
about it?
The problem of fragmentation is often seen as a jurisdictional or doctrinal one. As international law has expanded to
regulate a wider and wider array of human activity, specialized
bodies of law—international environmental law, international
human rights law, international investment law, international
trade law, international criminal law—have emerged. These
new specialties have been joined by increasingly specialized
courts, tribunals, and expert bodies. These new bodies have
joined an already large number of state courts capable of hearing international claims and pronouncing judgments on international rules. Almost inevitably, the combination of increasing specialization and choices of law announcing fora has led
to divergent views on what international law requires and what
international law rules actually mean. Without a single hierarchy of courts that might sort out these differences, fragmentation of international doctrine is the likely result.
Framed this way, it should not be surprising that many of
the proposed solutions have focused on either doctrine—reconciling doctrinal differences138 or devising doctrinal fixes to
resolve disputes139—or on jurisdiction—devising rules to manage when disputes should be heard by particular bodies140 and
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rules concerning how much respect certain bodies should give
the judgment of others.141
But the discussion of sources here suggests that the problem is not merely interpretative. It is not simply the doctrine
or forum choices that are fragmenting; the international community itself appears to be fragmenting. At least some of the
disputes described as fragmentation seem to have their origin
in disputes over the nature of the legal community and the
standards by which legitimate rules will be judged. Debates
over the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law—the extent to which human rights
rules (including the ICCPR) apply to the “global war on terror,”142 the specific effect of the “Martens clause” of the Hague
Conventions,143 the jurisdiction of human rights bodies to
141. See, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNACOURTS AND TRIBUNALS 278 (2003) (suggesting that courts exercise
comity towards each other); Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to
Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 261 (2007) (creating “a hierarchy with
the ICJ at its apex [and] . . . identif[ying] a number of ‘foundation stones’
for an institutional framework” that explains the amount of weight to be
given to judgments of different courts); Martinez, supra note 3, at 449–53
(providing examples of judicial doctrines aimed at creating judicial efficiency in cases of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction).
142. Compare U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 29, 32–34,
42–44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (affirming applicability of human rights law to targeted killings committed in the territory of
foreign states), with U.S. Dep’t of State, Second and Third Periodic Report of the
United States of America to the UN Committee on Human Rights Concerning the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex I (Oct. 21, 2005)
(asserting territorial limits to the ICCPR).
143. The Martens clause declares the view of the High Contracting Parties
that “[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, . . . populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience.” Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. A slightly different version appears in the 1907 Hague Convention. See Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277. Broad readings of the clause are used to support the integration of human rights norms into the law of war. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay)
(Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002) [hereinafter Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Decision—Detainees]; Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the RelationTIONAL
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consider law of war issues like detainee treatment144—all seem
better understood as conflicts between a human rights legitimacy community that prioritizes the interests of the individual
and human dignity and state-centered law-of-war community
that prioritizes state consent and views diminutions of state
sovereignty with suspicion. The conflict in the Kadi case, between the Security Council’s order to freeze the assets of designated individuals and European law concerns that due process
standards be met,145 might best be seen as a conflict between
more traditional state-centered readings of the U.N. Charter
and emerging norms of due process legitimacy in both the
human rights and global administrative law communities. Debates over the legality of generic drugs under the TRIPS agreement pit the human rights community’s expansive reading of
the promises in the Doha declaration146 regarding developing
countries and public health against First World trading states’
insistence on strict intellectual property protection and the
strictures of traditional rules of treaty interpretation.147

R
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ship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law,
86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 789, 797–98 (2004). States seeking to distinguish
the two areas of law more clearly read the clause much more narrowly. See
Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 85–86 (2000) (describing state positions).
144. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Reiteration and Further Amplification of Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay) (Oct. 28, 2005), reprinted in 45
I.L.M. 673 (2006); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Reiteration of Precautionary Measures Regarding Detainees in Guantanamo (July 23, 2002), reprinted in 45 I.L.M.
667 (2006); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Response of the United States to Request for
Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay) (Apr. 15, 2002), reprinted
in 41 I.L.M. 1015 (2002); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Decision—Detainees, supra
note 143.
145. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327. Kadi involved the Security Council’s decisions to freeze assets of individuals accused
of financing terrorism and the extent to which European states and the European Community could or should implement those decisions where state
and community norms of due process had not been met.
146. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
147. Although regularly invoked by advocates for developing countries
and human rights, the exact status of the declaration under international
law is in considerable dispute. See generally Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon,
An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public
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To be clear, some disagreements about international law
are unquestionably interpretative in nature. This Article does
not argue that all conflicts over international law doctrine are
conflicts over legitimacy rules, but the fact that some may be
changes how we might think about resolving them.148
In a sense, this makes the fragmentation of international
law part of a broader problem of transnational regime conflict—the conflicts and competition between international law
regimes, regional regimes,149 domestic regimes,150 and private
regulatory regimes—something the example of Global Administrative Law might already have suggested.151 It thus dovetails
well with the observations of pluralists, who have described
both these problems, one within international law and one
outside of it, as the result of conflict between overlapping jurisgenerative, normative, legal communities.152 To the extent
that the insights here have been prefigured by legal pluralists,

R

R
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Health, 5 J. INTL. ECON. L. 212 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the
Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 207 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, The
Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 291 (2002).
148. Furthermore, we may not be capable of reliably distinguishing between these two types of conflict. The possibility of legitimacy conflicts may
be a reality that cannot be avoided.
149. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
150. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Loewen Group Inc. v. United
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respondent’s Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction of January 5, 2001, 7 ICSID Rep. 421 (2005); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) (discussing cases).
151. Cf. Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at
188–89 (“However, there is no strong reason to limit the category of public
law entities—and of participants in inter-public law—to states. As transborder interactions among all such public law entities increase, situations
where they bump up against each other multiply, generating conflicts of law
arrangements in the public law sphere.”).
152. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 3, at 1003–04. Paul
Berman has also looked to the literature on legal pluralism for an answer,
but he has primarily focused on conflicts between competing official legal
communities, e.g., France and the United States, Europe and France, the ICJ
and the United States. He does imply though that legal pluralism’s insights
might apply to intra-regime conflicts as well, e.g., conflicts between international investment law and international human rights law, as well. See
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1228–35; Berman, Pluralist
Approach, supra note 11, at 316–20; Berman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 11, at
1110–12.
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153. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1177 (“Finally, pluralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist definition of ‘law.’ ”).
154. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
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the account here grounds those pluralist accounts, which have
generally been phrased at a high level of abstraction,153 in doctrinal terms and attempts to work through the doctrinal implications of such pluralist views. The account here bridges the
gap between doctrinal and theoretical conceptions of international law.
The aspect of this approach likely to cause the most difficulty is the overlapping nature of the legal communities in
question. (This is undoubtedly part of the reason that pluralist accounts of disputes within international law remain less
clear than pluralist accounts of disputes outside international
law.) Easy boundaries cannot be drawn around the community of international criminal law or the community of human
rights law or the community of global administrative law in the
way that they might be drawn between France and Germany.
Of course, even when talking about more traditional conflicts
between political entities, lines get blurred, as the conflicts between state law, regional law, and international law in Kadi
demonstrate.154 It is arguably the overlapping nature of each
of those regimes and the differing requirements they seem to
impose that made the case so devilishly difficult. Moreover,
one of the key contributions of legal pluralism was the recognition that colonial law never fully displaced the laws of the
colonized, that on the contrary, the two became intermeshed
as colonial peoples found themselves subject to the laws of
overlapping communities. The conflicts caused by fragmentation are as visceral as they are—between international humanitarian and international human rights law, for example—because they force individuals to confront the competing legitimacy of the overlapping communities to which they belong—
the rules, values, norms of each they normally keep compartmentalized.
But in their overlapping nature, these legal communities
also defy easy analogy to other types of conflicts. The conflicts
between these communities are both conflicts between subject
areas—which are usually resolved through doctrine—and conflicts between legal communities—which might be dealt with

32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 28 Side B

09/04/2012 13:10:36

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-4\NYI402.txt

1096

unknown

Seq: 48

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

4-SEP-12

11:08

[Vol. 44:1049

09/04/2012 13:10:36

155. In essence, it is as if tort law is provided by Georgia law and contract
law by Jewish law. The conflict between subject areas is co-extensive with the
conflict between legal regimes.
156. For a very insightful discussion of the problem with these analogies,
see Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law, in MULTI-SOURCE
EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Tomer Broude & Yuval
Shany eds., 2011).
157. Id. at 26.
158. Id. at 14.
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through conflicts of law rules.155 Doctrinal fixes fail to capture
the group interests reflected in opposing rules, while conflicts
of law rules, traditionally concerned with relationships to territory or government interests, seem inapposite to disputes between substantive areas of law.156 As Ralf Michaels and Joost
Pauwelyn insightfully explain, conflicts between substantive areas, what they refer to as conflicts of norms, often require balancing the interests involved. But “[s]ince balancing is a function of the relative weight of different principles, and this relative weight may be different within different legal systems,
balancing between legal systems will often not resolve the conflict between these different balancing results.”157 Conflicts of
law analogies fare no better. As they explain,
even where we can speak of different sub-systems or
branches of international law (say, [WTO] law and
human rights law), these are not defined by territory
or personality, and neither WTO law nor human
rights law has its own government with conceivable
governmental interests, so the criteria developed in
these particular conflict-of-laws approaches are not
applicable as such.158
If international law is spawning new overlapping legal communities, how then should we resolve disputes between them?
The goal of this Article is primarily descriptive—to show how a
more nuanced, updated approach to sources can reframe the
fragmentation problem—and a solution to these disputes is
beyond its scope. But recognizing that many of these disputes
are between communities and over legitimacy helps to at least
frame some of the options. There appear to be at least four
broad approaches available: (1) a conservative/common denominator approach, (2) a more radical/inclusive approach,
(2) a managerial/pluralist approach, and (4) a competition/
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politics approach. International tribunals and scholars have
already begun experimenting with some of these approaches,
perhaps tacit recognition that a choice of community mindset
is necessary.
A. The Conservative/Common Denominator Approach

09/04/2012 13:10:36

159. Of course, that is what Article 38 on its face purports to do—it provides a rule of decision for international courts.
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One approach to the fragmentation described here is to
retain the traditional doctrine of sources as a conflicts rule.
Such an approach would recognize that the traditional doctrine may not be an accurate description of international legal
sources, but would nonetheless use the traditional doctrine as
a rule of decision for resolving international disputes.159 In a
sense, this is how international law currently operates. Communities’ views on international legal sources may be evolving,
but those communities are still forced to argue in Article 38
terms. A novel legal argument will only succeed before a more
generalized international law body or with the more general
international law community to the extent that it can plausibly
be framed in traditional terms.
There are a number of arguments in favor of such an approach. One argument might simply go to manageability. A
likely complaint about the functional/plural approach to
sources and fragmentation described here might be that it is
simply too complex, too nuanced to be useful. Law needs legal fictions. The traditional doctrine of sources may be wrong,
but it remains a reasonably simple, and the only agreed-upon,
set of rules for resolving international law disputes.
A second argument goes to the common denominator aspect of this approach. States are necessary members of all
these new communities of international law. At the end of the
day, enforcing the rules of any of these regimes requires the
acquiescence of official state actors. States might not surprisingly want to retain a doctrine of sources that focuses on state
consent and official state action. Such rules allow them to control and monitor the rules being developed. To the extent
that states demand application of a more traditional set of
sources, there may be no other choice. It may also allow states,
as relatively organized, relatively representative, relatively re-
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160. Though it should be noted that this approach only affects areas of
conflict, communities would retain considerable autonomy over legitimacy
rules in the ordinary course of their affairs.
161. Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel suggest that something similar is currently going on, that through cross-interpretation between tribunals, different regimes have incorporated a “law of humanity” Grundnorm. See generally
Teitel & Howse, supra note 5, at 967–68.
162. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Case
T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2005
E.C.R. II-3533.
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sponsible actors (in democratic states at least, they may represent the interests of other stakeholders) to slow things
down, and to make sure that the rules emerging from much
less organized communities (which might be much more open
to capture) are fully vetted and thought through.
But states might not be alone in favoring such an approach. Although such an approach would certainly diminish
the autonomy of new communities,160 for example, human
rights, advocates within that community may prefer unity over
fragmentation. A fully plural approach that applies the rules
of each community to its own affairs decreases the chance that
the values of each community can influence each other.
Human rights advocates may not want to give up the opportunity to influence the norms of international humanitarian law;
members of the global administrative law community may
want the opportunity to argue that the norms they are developing should apply to public international law more generally.
Members of these communities may not be satisfied with autonomy, but instead have imperial ambitions. A single doctrine of sources can allow them to make arguments that slowly
shift the meaning of commonly held sources in the direction
they desire.161
The European Court of First Instance’s (CFI) approach to
the Kadi case162 provides a useful illustration. In that case, the
CFI was faced with a conflict between the Security Council’s
order to freeze the assets of designated individuals and European law concerns that due process standards be met. The
CFI approached the case from the standpoint of traditional
international law doctrine, under which the UN Charter provides no opportunity to review Security Council decisions and
under which the Charter has primacy over other regimes. In
line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only
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where jus cogens norms have been violated would there be a
possibility of review. The CFI considered the possibility that
Human Rights and Global Administrative Law principles (both
of which, it was claimed, were not met by the Security Council’s decision) could be translated into traditional doctrinal
terms, in this case a potential jus cogens norm of due process.
Had it recognized such a jus cogens norm, however, it would
have been a major victory for Human Rights and Global Administrative Law, one with implications across international
law. In this case, however, the CFI rejected that argument as
too novel.163
This is the problem, of course, with using the traditional
doctrine of sources. More traditional approaches will more
often than not prevail. It may not describe the actual life of
rules in the system, and it gives states considerable veto power
over rules that have been developing. Its focus on state consent is outdated. As a result, such an approach could prove
highly unstable and quickly unravel as communities of legitimacy rebel against the conservativeness of traditional doctrine.164
B. The Radical/Inclusive Approach

R

R
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163. See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19–22 (2010).
164. Cf. Cohen, supra note 8, at 95 (“[I]f the ‘law’ is commonly disregarded and seems to have little impact on action, the meaningfulness of the
‘law’ must be doubted.”).
165. As Benedict Kingsbury explains, states “are accustomed to the operation of the principles of public law.” Kingsbury, International Law as InterPublic Law, supra note 38, at 188.
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A more radical approach would seek to hear the voices of
all community members. The goal would be to find rules that
reflect the interests of as many stakeholders as possible. In
some cases, states may be relatively good interest aggregators
and a traditional doctrine built around state consent and state
negotiation may well represent the interested stakeholders.165
In the case of a dispute between communities, however, such
an approach would suggest using the legitimacy rules of the
most inclusive community whose members appear implicated.
For example, in a dispute between international humanitarian
law (arguably made by a community of states) and international human rights law (a community that now appears to in-
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clude individuals), such an approach would suggest judging
the particular rule according to emerging legitimacy rules of
international human rights law. Similar arguments have been
made in support of favoring human rights/environmental litigation brought by indigenous groups over investor-state arbitration of the same dispute.166 At first glance, such an approach might seem normatively appealing.
But this approach could prove difficult and potentially
dangerous. One problem is that this approach requires identifying the relevant stakeholders, a notoriously difficult task. (In
the modern, globally interconnected world, who isn’t a stakeholder in any given issue?) A more dangerous aspect of such
an approach is that it assumes that more inclusive communities are actually more representative communities and allows
them to trump the judgments of others. But this cannot be
assumed. Human rights law may directly involve individuals in
lawmaking, arguably making it more inclusive at the international level, but other interests, for example, of corporations,
may not be well represented in that community. The views of
states may actually reflect a more inclusive deliberative process—various stakeholders may have had their voices heard in
the formulation of the states’ views and the states’ views may
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166. See, e.g., Steven Donziger, The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor
Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8
(2010). Donziger makes several references to the arbitral tribunal non-representative nature. “A successful human rights or commercial claim against
a foreign entity could be snatched away by a private court of arbitrators in
which the party initially bringing suit cannot be heard and has little or no
recourse.” Id. at 12. “The communities, by arbitration rules, would not have
access to the proceedings, much less the opportunity to be a party. Chevron’s desired result would effectively strip tens of thousands of people of
their legal rights to seek a remedy against the perpetrator of what they consider to be an environmental crime on their ancestral lands.” Id. at 11. “A
typical arbitrator may never have visited the country over which he or she
will serve as de facto judge and jury and likely will have little appreciation for
the policy complexities at stake when the people who are often most impacted are not represented before the panel.” Id. at 12. “It is virtually impossible, given the arbitral rules that govern appointments, to have a panel
where the majority of arbitrators are outside of ‘The Club.’ Chevron’s appointed arbitrator in its hoped-for BIT case is an example of this phenomenon.” Id.
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reflect more balanced assessments of the competing interests.167
Attempting to apply such an approach to the Kadi case
mentioned above168 demonstrates the basic problem. Applied
to that case, the question would be whether the European or
Security Council regime was more representative of the relevant stakeholders. Arguments can be made in both directions.
On the one hand, the European model requires some due
process for the affected individual, perhaps allowing greater
individual participation. On the other hand, the Security
Council represents more interests around the world. Americans, for example, have their interests in being free from terrorism represented on the Security Council but not in the European Union or its machinery. There appears to be no neutral way to make the choice. Each regime is likely to see its
legitimacy rules as the most legitimate.
This framework thus raises the same concerns as traditional attempts to weigh the importance of competing regimes’ interests in their particular laws. From an external
point of view, as someone outside of either regime, there may
simply be no reliable metric for making such assessment. In at
least the most difficult cases, each regime probably sees its laws
as vital. In the same way, a determination of which community
is “most-representative” may defy neutral analysis. Each community will claim the mantle for itself. “Most-representative”
will be in the eye of the beholder.169

Paul Berman, writing from a pluralist perspective, has argued for a series of rules that grant greater autonomy to over-

09/04/2012 13:10:36

167. In the Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco example, see id., Chevron has argued
that it is actually the Ecuadorian litigation rather than the BIT arbitration
that is structurally biased and that the company has been denied due process
by officials biased in favor of the plaintiffs. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241,
272–95 (2010).
168. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
169. An approach that asks which legitimacy rules are most legitimate
would, of course, face similar problems.
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C. The Managerial/Pluralist Approach or “Let a
thousand flowers bloom”
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lapping communities. Examples of such approaches include:
subsidiarity, margins of appreciation, and complementarity.170
These approaches can be very attractive as the European example (margins of appreciation) and the International Criminal Court (complementarity) suggest. They give communities
room to develop their own norms. They also provide competing institutions with rules of decision (or really of respect/
comity) that allow them to remain agnostic in disputes over
which communities’ rules are better or worse. Rules granting
such limited autonomy are often applied by international regimes to the decisions made by states, but decisions by one
international regime to defer to the decisions of another
might be examples of such an approach applied between different international law communities. One example might be
the ICJ respectful treatment of ICTY findings regarding Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia.171
The problem with these approaches is that their very flexibility makes them largely indeterminate.172 It can be difficult
to choose between them and even more difficult to decide
R
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170. See generally Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10.
171. The Court concluded that
it should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant findings
of fact made by the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have
been upset on appeal. For the same reasons, any evaluation by the
Tribunal based on the facts as so found for instance about the existence of the required intent, is also entitled to due weight.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. 43, ¶ 223 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
91/13685.pdf [hereinafter ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention].
172. Using the Kadi case again as an example, under a margin of appreciation model, the ECJ might have asked whether the Security Council’s decision sufficiently respected due process. The ECJ itself made some references
to a possible margin of appreciation going in the other direction, granting
European states room to implement Security Council decisions differently.
See Giacinto della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law
Between the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 511, 519
(2009) (The ECJ points out that, once the UN has established a set of goals,
it leaves a considerable margin of appreciation for the fulfilment of these
objectives.”). In either case, however, it is unclear what the standard of review would actually be, nor is there a clear metric for weighing the two regime’s concerns.
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when their presumptions of autonomy should be overridden.173
D. “. . . and the weeds too” or the Competition/Politics Approach
A final approach would be no approach at all. Rather
than trying to solve fragmentation, such an approach would
encourage communities to do battle over norms. This perspective looks beyond the battle in a given court or tribunal to
the broader battle for community acceptance.
Unlike some of the other approaches, a competition approach does not look at fragmentation as a problem. On the
contrary, fragmentation, on this view, can be beneficial.174
One of the problems underlying fragmentation is that any
given court, tribunal, or expert body may have a limited mandate and may accordingly lack the perceived legitimacy to
speak authoritatively to the interests of different international
law communities. A human rights body may be perceived as
incompetent to consider international humanitarian law issues; a trade body’s authority to speak to environmental or
human rights concerns may be questioned.
One way to solve this legitimacy problem, particularly
where the creation of a single authoritative body seems unlikely, is to deny any given body a monopoly over interpretaR
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173. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1197 (“Thus, each of
the mechanisms described in this Part encounter excruciatingly difficult and
probably impossible to resolve problems as to how best to determine when
norms of one community should give way to norms of another and when, in
contrast, pluralism can be maintained.”); id. at 1236 (“The messiness of hybridity also means that it is impossible to provide answers ex ante regarding
occasions when pluralism should be honored and occasions when it should
be trumped.”); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 125 (2004) (“For over thirty years the Court has been
using the margin of appreciation and trying to explain that use with clarity.
It has failed. Today the doctrine remains broad, vague, and largely undefined, leading to unpredictable (and often arbitrary) results.”); Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 112 (2007)
(“[D]octrines like subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation seem too
vague to constrain international courts in the long run. Even in the European context, critics complain about how malleable these doctrines are.”).
174. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, Competition and Comity in the Fragmentation of International Law, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 119, 140–49 (2008)
(concluding that competition among tribunals can result in constructive diversity).
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175. See generally Cogan, supra note 5 (arguing that increasing competition
among international courts will more effectively constrain international judicial power and increase States’ willingness to accede to international judicial
authority).
176. See C. H. Powell, The United Nation Security Council, Terrorism and the
Rule of Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 37–41 (Victor V.
Ramraj et al. eds, 2012); see also Mattias Kumm, How Does European Union
Law Fit into the World of Public Law? Costa, Kadi, and Three Conceptions of Public
Law, in POLITICAL THEORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 134 (Jurgen Neyer &
Antje Wiener eds., 2010); see generally Christopher Michaelsen, The Security
Council’s Practice of Blacklisting Alleged Terrorists and Associates: Rule of Law Concerns and Prospects for Reform, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 71 (2010).
177. See ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, supra note 171, ¶ 406
(reasserting the “effective control” test after Tadic); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶
109–115 (setting out the “effective control” test).
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tion and dispute resolution.175 Allowing fora to compete allows multiple legal communities to reasonably claim that their
view is the correct one. Debates over international law are
eventually resolved not through courts, but through public debate and persuasion. This approach has the added benefit of
limiting the risks inherent in tribunals applying laws and principles they don’t fully understand. Each tribunal would be encouraged to stay within its own competence and expertise.
When the interests of other communities do make their way
into their decisions, it will be through modes of interpretation
that the tribunal’s community can find plausibly legitimate.
Returning to the Kadi case, the eventual decision of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) may provide an example of
such an approach in action. In its decision, the ECJ, like the
CFI before it, held that it could not review the Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on individuals accused of supporting terrorism. Nonetheless, it held that European regulations
implementing the Security Council’s decision, which were
within the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review, must be invalidated to
the extent to which they did not meet the due process norms
of European law. Perhaps as evidence that this sort or competition approach can work, the decision put European members of the Security Council in an awkward position, forcing
them to reengage with the Council on the issue, eventually resulting in reforms to the Security Council process.176 Another
example might be the back-and-forth jockeying between the
ICJ and the ICTY over whether “effective control”177 or “over-
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all control”178 is the proper test for attributing military actions
to a state.
The obvious drawback to a competition approach is that it
sacrifices the short-term for the future. Short-term losses in various fora may mean real injuries to communities or persons—
injuries that may simply be too much for some to bear.179 Prisoners may be executed in the course of debates over the death
penalty,180 Israel’s security barrier/wall/fence will remain in
place as the battle between the ICJ and Israeli Supreme Court
plays out,181 prisoners at Guantanamo may have to wait for legal process,182 Israel will be forced to defend itself internationally against the Goldstone Report while relations between
human rights law and international humanitarian law are
worked out, and the environment may be damaged or property rights lost in disputes between trade, investment, environmental, and indigenous rights communities.183 For those opposed to these results, waiting for more broadly legitimate law
may be waiting too long.
There is also no guarantee that better rules will always win
the competition. It is just as likely that the victors will be those
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178. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, ¶¶ 115–45 (July 15, 1999) (rejecting the ICJ’s “effective control”
test).
179. The foregoing listed are not injuries of my concern but would be the
injuries anticipated by those concerned about competition.
180. See generally Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding in a
habeas challenge to a murder conviction that an ICJ decision was not enforceable in U.S. courts); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights:
International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against
Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) (discussing three
Commonwealth Caribbean governments’ denunciation of human rights
treaties and petition procedures as a result of a series of rulings, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, restricting the execution of criminal
defendants); Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6 (discussing the execution of Medellı́n despite a
prior ICJ ruling that Medellı́n deserved to have his case reviewed).
181. See generally HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004]
IsrSC 58(4) 807, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004) (approving the construction of the wall); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9)
(holding that the construction of the wall is contrary to international law).
182. For examples of cases involving Guantanamo prisoners, see supra
note 144.
183. For examples of cases involving these issues, see supra notes 166–67.
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actors and those communities influential enough to impose
their will through international politics or strong enough to
wait other communities out.
****
Each of these approaches has benefits and drawbacks, and
it may not be possible to say with certainty that one approach
is superior to another in the abstract. Assessments of each approach seem inescapably tied to, even dominated by, questions
about power. Who will control the ultimate shape of the law:
the states and tribunals who control traditional doctrine,184
the actors who control the communities whose views are
granted room or respect, the tribunals who decide when to
turn a margin of appreciation on or off, or those actors strong
enough to outlast their competitors? A completely neutral approach seems impossible. From a legal standpoint, the best we
may be able to do is choose one approach, apply it consistently, recognize its weaknesses, and work to mitigate its
harms.185 But the unavoidability of considerations of power
perhaps highlights the reality that conflicts between communities over legitimacy rules can only ultimately be resolved
through politics.
V. CONCLUSION
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184. See generally Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the
Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 173 (2008).
185. Intriguingly, these four approaches demonstrate that discussions of
fragmentation and now-popular discussions of constitutionalization in international law are inextricably intertwined. Each of these approaches might
be seen as a set of constitutional conflicts rules, whether in the form of
supremacy clauses, dictating a hierarchy of sources, full-faith-and-credit
clauses, providing for comity between regimes, or fundamental rights and
default rules that serve as constitutional trumps. The more general international law responds to fragmentation by taking on the role of a conflicts
regime, the more its rules will look constitutional in form.
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The purview of international regimes concerning the environment, trade, human rights, and armed conflict continue
to expand. The number of norm articulating bodies continues to multiply. Instances of conflict between them seem destined to rise. And the parade of proposed solutions to interna-
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tional law’s fragmentation seems likely to march on indefinitely.
But in developing their proposed solutions, few scholars
or judges have taken the time to ask what the reality of fragmentation tells us about the nature of international law. In
fact, the fragmentation of international law, the progressive
development of alternative understandings of international
law doctrine, has only highlighted a broader problem in international law—that doctrine only marginally resembles international law as practiced, that doctrinal categories have become
mere formalities into which current practice must be plugged.
Recognizing this reality and rethinking international law’s
sources can provide a fresh approach to fragmentation, helping to clarify what’s really at stake in conflicts over international law’s content and meaning. A revised doctrine of
sources can highlight, rather than hide, the deep normative
conflicts that may underlie disagreements between human
rights and international humanitarian law, international environmental law and international investment. And in place of
ineffective doctrinal tweaks that might only exacerbate existing conflicts or raise questions about international law’s
force, it can suggest forms of dialogue, settlement, and contestation that recognize the depth of these disagreements even as
they seek to manage them.
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